

[on limitations on dissemination
pre-Crisis]

PSALM

Meeting 18 Feb 1963: McG, R, McN, McC

(on public positions)

Agreed: no special control over dissemination of
unverified info - except between 15-22 Oct. There were
justified limitations on widespread dissemination

[Wilson: CIB used by 30,000 in Wash?] of unverified
info. There were also, by some Admin spokesmen [McG?]
too energetic assertions that because we did not have
credible evidence of Sov personnel & weapons beyond those
in the agreed estimates, no such personnel or weapons
were in fact in Cuba. some overstatements were made.

... We ^{also} agreed in retrospect there were discernible
weaknesses in the ^(intell) process: as, e.g. that the estimate
took too little account of the possibility of a dangerous new
departure in Sov policy; that there was a lack of all-out
energy in framing and presenting intell. requirements; that
delays in executing approved recon missions were not
reported upward, or monitored downward; and that

dissenting recommendations were not carried to the Pres.
Remedial action on all three rather in hands of DCI,
who himself accurately anticipated the low move.

...(above): There were reports of sufficient interest to lead
to targeting of 14 Oct overflight, but no reports
which led to changes in the estimates of any intell.
agency as reported to Pres's senior advisors.

[When has that device been used to
flag input of current intell?]